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ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT LEGISLATIVE
TREND TOWARDS INCREASED
REGULATION AND INVESTOR




HE Brazilian securities market has traditionally been one of the
strongest securities markets in South America.' Although still
considered an emerging market, the Brazilian securities market
has undergone a series of legislative changes over the past five years de-
signed to provide increased investor protection through more stringent
governmental regulation and enforcement.2 These legislative changes
have strengthened the position of minority shareholders, 3 increased the
total portion of share capital necessary to have control of a corporation,4
placed stricter regulations on independent auditors,5 proposed an initia-
tive to "[modernize] the accounting approach provided for under the
Corporate Act... and bring it in line with best international accounting
practices (International Accounting Standards - IAS)," 6 and lowered the
amount of representation necessary to elect a member to the board of
directors of a corporation.7 To give these new laws the desired effective-
ness, they have been combined with more rigorous governmental en-
*Micah Harper is a third year law student at the Dedman School of Law, Southern
Methodist University, and is available for comment at mharper@grade-it.com.
1. Euchdrio Lerner Rodrigues, Brazil: Macroeconomic Features, EMERGING MAR-
KETS COMPANION, available at http://www.emgmkts.comI/research/braziliansec/
macroeconomic.htm (June 1996).
2. CVM Chairman Josd Luiz Osorio, Global Portfolio Investments: Opportunities
and Barriers in Emerging Markets, Presentation Before IOSCO Conference 2002,
available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/public/publUPublDiscIOSCO.asp (May
2002) [hereinafter IOSCO Speech].
3. Decreto No. 10.303, de 31 de Outubro de, D.O.U., de 11.01.2001, available at
http://www.planalto.gov.br (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
4. Nadia Villagomez, Brazilian Governance: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, THE
ISS FRIDAY REPORT, Nov. 2001, at 2 [hereinafter ISS FRIDAY REPORT].
5. See CVM Instruction No. 308, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br (last visited Nov.
9, 2003).
6. IOSCO Speech, supra note 2, at 5; see Proposed Bill No. 3,741.
7. IOSCO Speech, supra note 2, at 5.
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forcement. "In 2001, [the Brazilian Securities and Exchange
Commission] judged 37 administrative inquiries, more than twice the av-
erage of 18.2 judgments per year from 1996 to 2000."8
II. OVERVIEW: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION OF BRAZIL
The Commissdo de Valores Mobilidrios (Brazilian Securities and Ex-
change Commission, CVM) was created in 1947 as "an independent gov-
ernment entity. . . linked to the Ministry of Finance."9 Along with the
Ministry of Finance, the CVM is charged with the following duties:
1. Stimulate the creation of savings and their investment in
securities;
2. Promote the expansion, regular, and efficient operation of the
stock market, and stimulate permanent investments in the capital
stock of public companies controlled by private Brazilian capital;
3. Guarantee the efficient and correct operation of stock markets
and over-the-counter markets;
4. Protect securities holders and market investors against:
(a) the irregular issue of securities;
(b) illegal acts of officers and controlling shareholders of publicly
held companies, or managers of securities portfolios;...
5. Avoid or prevent any kind of fraud or manipulation intended to
create artificial conditions of supply, demand, or price of the se-
curities traded on the market;
6. Guarantee public access to information on the securities traded
and the companies issuing them; [and]
7. Guarantee the observance of equitable business practice on the
securities market. 10
Much like the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United
States, the CVM is the governmental entity charged with regulation,
oversight, and enforcement of the Brazilian securities markets." Its crea-
tion in 1947 began the long process of ending deregulation in Brazilian
capital markets and encouraged foreign investment. 12 According to Ary
Oswaldo Mattos Filho, CVM president, "the importance of securities
market reform in the short term is to make the Brazilian corporate sector
more open, and by doing so to restore its credibility.'1 3
8. I& at 7.
9. Decreto No. 6.385, de 7 de Dezembro de 1976, art. 5, D.O.U. de 7.12.1976, availa-
ble at http://www.cvm.gov.br (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
10. Id. at art. 4.
11. Id.
12. Clarissa Souza della Nina, Public Debt Control in Brazil, INST.OF BRAZ. IssuEs,
GEO. WASH. U., Spring 1997, at 2, available at http://www.gwu.edu/-ibi/minerva/
Spring1997/Clarissa.Souza.della.Nina.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
13. Eric Laursen, Welcome to the Jungle: Brazil's Securities Reform Puts the Muscle on
Local Companies, ASSET INT'L, INc., Sept. 1991, available at http//www.assetpub.
corn (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
BRAZILIAN SECURITIES MARKET
III. KEY LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS OF THE PAST FIVE YEARS
A. CVM INSTRucrION No. 308 oF 1999
On May 14, 1999, the CVM issued CVM Instruction No. 308, which
mainly dealt with independent auditing firms and the audits of publicly
held companies. 14 One significant provision of this Instruction requires
that all independent auditors appointed after the passage of the legisla-
tion be registered with the CVM, which will evaluate their professional
capabilities. 15 This provision is an attempt to impose minimum require-
ments of professional capability on the independent auditing community,
and has had a significant impact on the independent auditing community
already. 16 Another significant provision initiates a mandatory five-year
rotation period for independent auditors of publicly held companies,
prohibiting independent auditors from providing auditing services to the
same client for more than five consecutive years. 17 This requirement will
help minimize the possibility of fraud stemming from a close personal
relationship between the auditor and the public company and helps en-
sure the auditor's objectivity.
Additionally, independent auditors are prohibited from rendering a
number of consulting services that "could result in the loss of objectivity
and independence.' 8 Independent auditors are prohibited from being "a
partner, director, or responsible professional who has an employment re-
lationship"'19 with the audited company and are prohibited from owning
securities issued by the audited company.20 These provisions are an obvi-
ous attempt to prevent conflicts of interest in the auditor in order to
avoid tainting the reliability of audited statements.
Finally, the law requires independent auditors to "implement an inter-
nal quality control program . . .which seeks to guarantee full compli-
ance" 21 and to "submit their quality control for review" every four
years.22 This final provision will help alleviate the CVM's daunting task
of ensuring compliance and reliability of audited statements on an ongo-
ing basis.
B. COMPARISON TO RECENT UNITED STATES LEGISLATION
A brief examination of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 23 passed by the United
States in 2002 puts the significance of these legislative changes into per-
14. See CVM Instruction No. 308, supra note 5.
15. Id. at art. 1.
16. See BDO SEmMAN, LLP, BDO DIRECrA: CMV: BRAZILIAN SECURrIES COMM'N,
July 13, 1999, at http://www.bdo.com.br/audit/ing/txtnews5.htm.
17. CVM Instruction No. 308, supra note 5, at art. 31.
18. Id. at art. 23(11).
19. Id at art. 11.
20. Id. at art. 23(I).
21. Id. at art. 32.
22. Id. at art. 33.
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 804(a), 116 Stat. 745, 801
(2002).
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spective. Unlike Brazil, the United States does not currently require pub-
lic companies to rotate independent auditors on any set schedule. 24 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act charges the Securities and Exchange Commission
with conducting a study to determine the need for a five-year rotation
period,2 5 which is evidence that Congress believes that such a limitation
may have merit. Also, it was not until passage of this Act in 2002 that the
United States prohibited independent auditors from performing a major-
ity of consulting services for their clients, a full three years after the paral-
lel prohibition in Brazil.2 6 The United States' adoption of these practices
serves as a kind of ratification of the CVM's efforts under this
Instruction.
C. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BILL OF 2001
Enacted on November 1, 2001, Brazil's Corporate Governance Bill
made a number of changes to the existing securities regulation land-
scape.2 7 One of the most significant changes was the increased protection
afforded minority shareholders. 28 The primary protections granted to mi-
nority shareholders under this act are "tag-along" rights relating to the
transfer of control of a publicly held company.2 9 As proposed, the law
would have required the purchaser to offer minority shareholders 100
percent of the amount paid for the controlling block of shares.30 As
passed, the law requires the purchaser to "conduct a public offer to ac-
quire the voting shares owned by the remaining [minority] shareholders.
The offer price for such shares shall be at least [80 percent] of the amount
paid for the voting shares comprising the controlling block. '3 1 The likely
objective of these added protections for minority shareholders is to en-
courage investor confidence with respect to equity positions that are less
than controlling and are, by their nature, subject to the decisions of ma-
jority shareholders. Although still not an ideal solution for investors, "its
passage carries with it the message that Brazil does not turn a deaf ear to
the plight of minority shareholders. '32
Additionally, "where companies were previously permitted to have
two-thirds of issued capital in nonvoting preference shares and one-third
in voting common shares, the new law limits the number of preference
shares to 50 percent of the share capital. '3 3 The effect of this change is
that "the total portion of share capital necessary to have control increases
to 26 percent" from the previous requirement of 17 percent. 34 It also
24. See id. § 203.
25. 1& § 207.
26. Id. § 201.
27. IOSCO Speech, supra note 2, at 5.
28. Decreto No. 10.303, supra note 3.
29. Id.
30. ISS FRIDAY REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
31. Decreto No. 10.303, supra note 3.




forces those shareholders who control the corporation to have a larger
percent of ownership, and therefore a larger stake with respect to the
ramifications of their decisions. This more closely aligns their interests
with those of minority shareholders.
Finally, this new piece of legislation lowers the percentage of common
stock necessary to elect a member to the board of directors from 20 per-
cent to 15 percent.35 This lowers the threshold of ownership necessary to
ensure direct representation of minority shareholders with respect to
management of the company and its operating decisions. Where in the
past minority shareholders of voting stock of less than 20 percent were
without direct representation and thus at the mercy of the majority share-
holders, now minority shareholders with at least a 15 percent voting eq-
uity position have a directly elected voice in the management of the
company's affairs.
D. LAW 10,411 OF FEBRUARY 2002
The CVM underwent a fundamental evolution of form in 2002 when it
was granted "independent administrative authority, fixed terms of office
and stability for its directors. ' 36 Although tied to the Ministry of Fi-
nance, "the [CVM] does not report to the Ministry. It [now has] the au-
thority to oversee the derivatives market and will be able to investigate
and - most importantly - enforce breaches or irregularities in the securi-
ties market. ' 37 The effect of this evolution was to insulate the CVM and
its management from the political pressures typically associated with be-
ing a governmental entity. Pursuant to this new law, the CVM enjoys a
direct grant of authority, and its director's terms are no longer subject to
shifting political agendas.
E. PROPOSED BILL No. 3,741
Proposed Bill No. 3,741, legislation that would adopt International Ac-
counting Standards (IAS), is currently pending before the Brazilian Con-
gress. Passage of this bill would "contribute to the harmonization of this
legal framework and bring it in line with best international accounting
practices. '38 Currently, Brazil uses its own set of national accounting
practices. 39 By adopting IAS, corporate financial statements would be-
come more transparent to international investors and give those investors
a greater sense of confidence with respect to their investments. 40 Accord-
ing to CVM Chairman Jos6 Luiz Osorio, "the initiative is particularly im-
portant and necessary in a world where cross-border investments are a
vital force behind the development of all nations."'41
35. IOSCO Speech, supra note 2, at 5.
36. Id.
37. ISS FRIDAY REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
38. IOSCO Speech, supra note 2, at 5; see Proposed Bill No. 3,741, supra note 6.
39. CVM Instruction No. 308, supra note 5, at arts. 20-21.
40. IOSCO Speech, supra note 2, at 5.
41. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Brazilian legislative actions of the past five years have been aimed
at providing increased investor protection through more stringent gov-
ernmental regulation and enforcement. By enacting regulations to pro-
tect minority shareholders, the CVM has given investors more confidence
that their interests will still be represented when taking minority posi-
tions. The regulation of independent auditors allows investors to rely
more heavily on audited statements when making investing decisions, not
having to be concerned that the statements are subject to undisclosed
conflicts of interest or incompetent auditing abilities. The proposal to
shift accounting principles to comply with IAS allows international inves-
tors to read financial statements more easily and encourages their invest-
ment in the Brazilian marketplace. All of these legislative initiatives,
taken together, have the effect of strengthening the Brazilian securities
market and encouraging investment. Although still a work in progress,
the securities market in Brazil is on its way to becoming a stable and open
marketplace.
